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Abstract  
In the current paper, we review existing models of the aetiology of voice hearing. We 
summarise the argument and evidence that voice hearing is primarily a dissociative process, 
involving critical aspects of self. We propose a complementary perspective on these 
phenomena that is based on a modern behavioural account of complex behaviour, known as 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT). This type of approach to voice hearing concerns itself with: 
the functions served for the individual by this voice hearing; the necessary history, such as 
trauma, that establishes these functions; and the relevant dissociative processes involving self 
and others. In short, we propose a trauma-dissociation developmental trajectory in which 
trauma impacts negatively on the development of self, through the process of dissociation. 
Using the RFT concept of relations of perspective-taking, our dissociation model purports that 
trauma gives rise to more co-ordination than distinction relations between self and others, thus 
weaking an individual’s sense of a distinct self. Voice hearing experiences, therefore, reflect 
an individual’s perceptions of self and others, and may indicate impairments in the natural 
psychological boundaries between these critical related concepts. One clinical implication 
suggested by this model is that therapeutic ‘intervention’ should understand the behaviours 
associated with a sense of self that is fragile and threatened by others. Relations with self and 
others should be a key focus of therapy, as well as interventions designed to enhance a 
coherent distinct sense of self.    
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In the current paper, we attempt to provide an overview of the putative processes involved in 
voice hearing, and how these relate to trauma and dissociation. In the first half, we offer a 
brief overview of the literature on voice hearing, trauma and dissociation and how these 
interact. In the second half, we attempt to provide a functional-analytic account of voice 
hearing and its relationship with dissociation and trauma, in terms of a modern behavioural 
approach to language and cognition, known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Our aim is to develop a precise and functional-analytic 
model of the development and maintenance of voice hearing (irrespective of voice 
charactrertics or valence) as possible pathways of dissociative processes.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this type of analysis is not currently available in the relevant literatures. 
The Relationship between Trauma and Voice Hearing 
Varese, Smeets et al. (2012) reported in a meta-analysis that individuals with histories 
of childhood adversity (including sexual/physical/emotional abuse and neglect) are 2.8 times 
more likely to develop psychosis. Furthermore, Janssen et al. (2004) found a dose-response 
relationship between sexual abuse and voice hearing. The relationship between these variables 
is supported by psychophysiological evidence that specific brain features (e.g. overactive 
HPA axis) are shared by individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and children with a trauma 
history (Read, Fosse, Moskowitz, & Perry, 2014). 
In an epidemiological review, Read, van Os, Morrison, and Ross (2005) found that 
hearing voices was associated with childhood trauma significantly more than any other 
symptom of psychosis (including delusions). A wealth of studies has reported direct 
correlations between voice hearing and trauma (see Bentall et al., 2014). In a review, 
McCarthy-Jones (2011) reported that child sexual abuse predicted a two-fold risk of voice 
hearing and a six-fold risk of commenting/commanding voices.  
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Multiple reviews have indicated that early trauma is prevalent in voice hearers whether 
or not they are clinically distressed (e.g. Longden, Madill, & Waterman, 2012; Read et al., 
2005). Indeed, Daalman et al. (2012) demonstrated that both groups were equally likely to 
have experienced sexual and emotional abuse. However, some empirical evidence suggests 
that the trauma experienced by non-clinical voice hearers may be less intense (e.g. Goldstone, 
Farhall, & Ong, 2012). Some authors have also suggested that attachment (specifically 
disorganisation) is related to the development of voice hearing and other psychotic 
experiences (see Liotti and Gumley, 2008, for a review). 
 Pathways to voice hearing. A number of cognitive and behavioural models have 
explained the potential pathways from trauma to psychosis (see Waters et al., 2012, for a 
review). For example, Morrison and Petersen (2003) found that this developmental trajectory 
is self-mediated through factors that include dissociation, attribution style and/or 
interpretations of intrusions. Specifically, McCarthy-Jones (2012) referred to emotional 
isolation, including shame, self-blame and the inability to express these emotions. Other 
studies highlighted the role of social isolation and the moderating effect of social defeat 
(Shevlin, McElroy, & Murphy, 2014; Van Nierop et al., 2014). These features accord with 
Hoffman’s (2007) social deafferation hypothesis, in which social withdrawal facilitates the 
emergence of false social meanings as hallucinatory or delusional intrusions.  
Consistent with the strong association with trauma, models of voice hearing often 
propose that these events are on a continuum with normal experiences, such as vivid 
daydreams and thoughts (Launay & Slade, 1981; Slade & Bentall, 1988). But, at its more 
extreme end, this continuum may involve externalising biases (i.e. misattributions of internal 
events to external sources; Allen, Aleman, & McGuire, 2007; Bentall et al., 2014). 
Specifically, there is evidence that periods of high stress (internal or external) make source 
monitoring more difficult and increase misattributions of internal content to external sources 
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(Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013). There is also evidence that self-monitoring is 
impoverished in voice hearing (Johns et al., 2010). Steel, Fowler, and Holmes (2005) 
proposed that the upper end of this continuum involves deficits in the context integration of 
present experiences that resemble past events, again exacerbated by stress. In short, reduced 
context integration of present experiences increases proneness to intrusions.  
Negative beliefs about voices also appear to play a role in level of distress. Indeed, they 
correlate highly with distress and trauma (Bartels-Velthuis, van de Willige, Jenner, Wiersma, 
& van Os, 2012; Romme & Escher, 2006). In addition, perception of the power of voices at 
voice onset appears to be critical to level of distress experienced subsequently (e.g. Andrew, 
Gray, & Snowden, 2008; Chadwick, Lees, & Birchwood, 2000; Romme, Escher, Dillon, 
Corstens, & Morris, 2009).  
Does Dissociation Mediate Voice Hearing? 
 Many authors have argued that dissociation accounts for the relationship between 
trauma and voice hearing (Longden et al., 2012; Moskowitz & Corstens, 2007; Varese, 
Barkus, & Bentall, 2011; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012). Dissociation typically refers to a 
‘lack of normal integration of thoughts, feelings and experiences into the stream of 
consciousness and memory’ (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986, p.727), and common presentations 
include amnesia, imaginative involvement, absorption, depersonalisation and derealisation. 
These topographies or types of behaviour support Kennedy et al.’s (2004) assumption that 
these experiences decrease awareness of distressing internal and external stimuli. Consistent 
with the view of voice hearing as a continuum, dissociation is also believed to be dimensional, 
ranging from cohesive to fragmented (e.g. Putnam, 1991; Scharfetter, 2008).  
A considerable body of evidence supports a relationship between dissociation and voice 
hearing (e.g. Kilcommons & Morrison, 2005; Ross & Keyes, 2004; Moskowitz, Schafer, & 
Dorahy, 2008; Dorahy et al., 2009). For example, there is evidence that individuals with 
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hallucinations have more dissociative experiences than those with a diagnosis of psychosis 
without hallucinations (Perona-Garcelán et al., 2008; Varese, Udachina, Myin-Germeys, 
Oorschot, & Bentall, 2011). There is also evidence that depersonalisation and absorption are 
more prevalent in individuals with hallucinations and hallucination proneness (Altman, 
Collins, & Mundy, 1997; Morrison & Petersen, 2003). Furthermore, Alderson-Day et al. 
(2014) have recently found that inner speech, especially self-evaluative speech (e.g. I should 
do X) involving others (e.g. they will think I am X), correlates with dissociative experiences, 
predicts voice proneness, and this effect is mediated by dissociation. 
 Dissociation also appears to mediate the relationship between trauma and voice 
hearing (see Longden et al., 2012, for a review). Specifically, Varese, Barkus et al. (2012) 
found that dissociation precedes voice onset, and mediates the relationship between sexual 
abuse and voice-proneness (see also Anketell et al., 2010; Moskowitz & Corstens, 2007; 
Moskowitz, Read, Farrelly, Rudegeair, & Williams, 2009).  
 Is the ‘self’ dissociated? Many areas of psychology appeal to aspects of the self as 
central to psychological suffering (e.g. Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, McHugh, & Hayes, 
2004). Numerous models of dissociation, especially those linking trauma and voice hearing, 
also implicate the self in dissociative features or processes. That is, voices are considered to 
be intrusions of dissociated experiences in which aspects of the self fail to be integrated, 
probably as a result of trauma and as a means of avoiding or coping with traumatic events 
(Van der Hart, Nijenhuis, Steele, & Brown, 2004). This view is supported by empirical 
evidence (e.g. Brewin & Patel, 2010; Clemmensen et al., 2014; Perona-Garcelán et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, Allen, Coyne, and Console (1997) proposed that trauma-induced dissociation 
that comprises alterations in the self increases vulnerability to voice hearing through 
decreased external grounding and impaired reality testing.  
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Lack of self-integration is used to describe or explain the alterations in the self which 
mediate the relationship between dissociation and voice hearing (Perona-Garcelan, Perez-
Alverez, Garcia-Montes, & Cangas, 2015; Steel et al., 2005). For example, Ross (2009) 
suggested that this lack of integration involves the conscious mind, ego, or executive self, and 
renders the sub-selves fragmented and disconnected. Similarly, Longden et al. (2012) have 
argued that the dissociation of voice hearing reflects an alteration in the normal associative 
aspects of self and self-in-relation-to-others. Specifically, McIntee and Crompton (1997) 
suggested that dissociation results from an individual’s attempt to develop a false self that 
reduces the impact of on-going trauma. From a cognitive perspective, Young (1999) refers to 
this as maladaptive schema of the self and others that facilitate avoidance of unbearable 
negative affect. From a psychodynamic perspective, dissociation reflects intra-psychic 
defences against trauma that permit pretending that trauma is not real and acting as if there is 
more than one part to the self (e.g. Mollon, 1996). And Mollon suggested that this begins with 
the child’s self-hypnotic assertion: I am not here; this is not happening to me; I am not in this 
body.    
Perona-Garcelan et al. (2015) proposed Dialogical Self Theory (see Hermans & Gieser, 
2012) as a phenomenological model of voice hearing as dialogical experiences of the self, 
where self is dissociated into different perspectives. Accordingly, the perspectives of the self 
(referred to as I positions) are dissociated, such that each I represents different values that are 
inconsistent with the individual’s history. The model argues that voices develop from two key 
processes. The first is dissociation, in which the normal integration of experiences into the 
self is interrupted. This results in distancing and loss of perspective of the I-positions, and 
usually occurs through absorption and derealisation. The individual loses awareness that these 
events are private and experiences them as not me in the struggle to maintain a sense of self. 
The coherence of the relationship between the person and the ensuing voices thereafter 
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determines the dialogue features of the voices. The second process is early negative schemas, 
in which negative beliefs about the self, others, and the world begin to shape the I-positions. 
As a result, the I-positions acquire their own perspectives of reality and individual narratives. 
Some authors have proposed that the experience of trauma, particularly in early 
childhood, may facilitate fragmentation between those aspects of self that are preoccupied by 
adverse events and those aspects of the self that are contextualised by daily functioning (van 
der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 2006). Accordingly this fragmentation makes it difficult to 
integrate one’s history (psychologically) into current processes. There is evidence that this can 
lead to past experience being de-contextualised and experienced as current, and being 
categorised as non-autobiographical (rather than self-referential, Bromberg, 1995). It has been 
demonstrated that these parallel outcomes may be core features of dissociation (Dorahy & van 
der Hart, 2007).  
In this latter half of the current paper, we attempt to provide a functional-analytic 
approach to voice hearing and its relationship with dissociation. In short, we ask about the 
putative behavioural processes that underpin both, how these processes emerge, how they are 
maintained, and to what extent they reflect the normal processes of cognition or represent 
possible alterations of these. In proposing this view, we rely upon Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT), a modern functional-analytic approach (briefly explained below) to language and 
cognition that has amassed a very considerable body of empirical support over several 
decades (see Hayes et al., 2001; Dymond & Roche, 2013).  
A Functional-analytic View of Voice Hearing 
 Although almost all schools of thought in psychology have offered comprehensive, 
eloquent and often overlapping accounts of psychotic experiences, including voice hearing, 
very little has emerged from the behavioural community. In simple terms, a functional-
analytic or behavioural approach seeks to ascertain the functions of behaviours that are 
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problematic for an individual. The functions of behaviour are typically determined by 
behavioural psychologists who observe the target behaviour directly and ask questions of the 
individual (and sometimes others) about the different contexts in which this behaviour does 
and does not occur. The primary aim of doing this so-called functional-analysis is to then be 
able to alter the behaviour by altering the context. In short, the assumption is that changes in 
context will produce changes in behaviour (e.g. if reinforcement ceases, behaviour should 
decrease). In the current context, the least one might expect from this school of thought would 
be hypotheses about why and how voice hearing occurs (i.e. what might the historical or 
current antecedents be) and is maintained (i.e. the psychological functions, such as escape, 
served by these behaviours). However, in our examination of the literature on psychosis, we 
identified only one such account, by Rosenfarb (2013) which adopted a traditional 
behavioural view in which voices emerge when “other, more potent and appropriate 
reinforcers are unavailable” (p.933). Accordingly, this loss of reinforcement forces the 
individual to redirect his/her focus inwards which minimises the impact of other aversive 
experiences (i.e. escape responding) and may itself be reinforcing (similar to the concept of 
self-reinforcement). 
If one considers what the functions of voice hearing might be, hearing voices (as is the 
case with most behaviour) was introduced into, and has been maintained in the individual’s 
behavioural repertoire, because it serves some, or many, functions (note that functions often 
change across time). It is important to clarify that the functions served by the behaviour of 
voice hearing should not be confused with evaluations of voices that are heard. For example, 
frightening and dictatorial voices may serve the same functions as voices that are pleasant and 
supportive. That is, a voice hearer may listen to and/or act upon (these are two possible 
functions of voices), the advice of both. In this case, one would say that the function served 
by both types of voice is appetitive (i.e. listening to these voices provides reinforcement). 
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Similarly, a voice hearer may try to distract herself from all types of voices she hears (e.g. by 
listening to music). Again, the same aversive function is served by these different types of 
voice (i.e. this is escape responding). 
Of course, accurately determining the various functions of complex behaviour, such as 
voice hearing, is not as straightforward as our simple distinction above between approach and 
escape behaviours. First, all behaviour results from both a historical and a current context, and 
both must be appreciated if the behaviour in question is to be fully understood. Second, the 
function of a new behaviour may change as the behaviour becomes more established, because 
behaviour readily acquires new functions. For instance, individuals who hear voices for the 
first time may try distraction (i.e. escape behaviour), but when this fails to work reliably, the 
voice hearer may feel that she has no choice but to listen to the voices (approach behaviour). 
Across time, therefore, the same behaviour can have multiple functions and it can be difficult 
to decipher which contexts control which functions.  
In the context of challenging behaviour in which functional analyses are most 
commonly conducted, clinicians separate out the various topographies of behaviour (i.e. what 
the behaviour actually looks like in its different forms) because some topographies readily 
(but not reliably) reflect specific functions and the type of history that gave rise to the 
behaviour. Consider a voice hearer whose mother is manipulative and abusive, and who hears 
two voices, “The Angel” and “The Witch”. The Angel is perceived as soothing and nurturing, 
and provides escape from reality and rejection, hence this voice has both appetitive and 
escape functions. The Witch enables the voice hearer to categorise and make sense of what is 
difficult to explain or disclose (i.e. all witches are bad, but mothers are typically not, so the 
Witch voice absorbs/explains the behaviour of the mother)1. Hence, the functions served by 
                                                          
1 The latter function may not be discriminated by a voice hearer who may perceive the content 
of the voice of “The Witch” to be as threatening as if the “witch” was real. Many voice 
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this latter voice are appetitive and facilitate a sense of coherence. When the functions of 
voices are analysed in this way, it becomes clear why a young person in a traumatic and 
threatening environment might begin to absorb these experiences into the content of heard 
voices. For example, an individual in a highly threatening environment will do whatever is 
necessary to escape. And when actual physical escape is not possible, psychological escape 
(involving changes in the perception of self and others) potentially provides an alternative 
means of responding. 
 It is likely too simplistic to assume that escape from reality, coping and distraction are 
the only functions served by voices. Voice hearing clearly comprises complex behaviour that 
includes rules (internal and external) about the self and others. Hence, one should not mistake 
a functional-analytic account for a simplistic one: its focus is precision, not simplicity. As 
noted previously, our aim here is to use a functional-analytic approach to begin to ask 
questions about the types of behavioural processes at work in voice hearing. This is done with 
the hope of better understanding these experiences, and ultimately changing them in the 
service of the individual, where appropriate. Toward these aims, we have constructed the 
following list of hypotheses which emerge from adopting this approach in the context of the 
complex phenomena of voice hearing. While we believe many of these suggestions are 
already available, we are not aware that they have been collated in this way and we propose 
that doing so is essential if one wishes to move towards identifying the functions of voice 
hearing and exploring the behavioural processes involved.  
When one begins to consider the possible functions of voice hearing through the 
existing literature on the relationships among dissociation, trauma and voice hearing, a 
number of hypotheses regarding these relationships emerge. Again, these suggestions are not 
                                                          
hearers can only extract the functions of their voices after working with a therapist or support 
group.  
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generated only by a functional-analytic approach, many exist already (such as those 
mentioned in the previous section). But, approaching the relevant experiences in this way is 
consistent with these existing views. 
1. All aspects of an individual’s voice experiences should be acknowledged because they 
are potentially helpful in determining the functions and history of this behaviour.  
2. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of the experienced history of the individual (not 
simply a clinical background) must be acquired to be able to hypothesise about the 
functions served historically and currently by hearing voices (because from a 
functional-analytic perspective all behaviour is a result of its context).  
3. Voice hearing is not by definition problematic. This behaviour should only be deemed 
problematic if it clearly impairs the quality of the individual’s life and access to 
reinforcers (such as meaningful social contact), and causes distress. The individual 
must, therefore, be fully involved in defining whether the behaviour is problematic (for 
them or significant others) or not.  
4. The presence of early trauma is most likely associated with failure to meet the child’s 
needs and thus typical approach behaviours for attention and soothing, for example, will 
be observed less. This renders alternative behaviours with the same functions more 
likely. For instance, if a child is presented with no nurturing by a caregiver, she may 
seek this (excessively, contextually speaking) at school, socially or even as part of her 
internal experience (e.g. imaginary support).    
5. When needs are not met, alternative behaviours will also occur as a means of 
understanding and coping with the very fact that needs are not met (e.g. withdrawal 
from others).  
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6. These coping mechanisms and experiences relate in a directly functional way to the 
events, people etc. that participate in that environment, hence the relationship between 
the victim’s behaviour and the context should not be understated.  
7. These coping mechanisms and experiences become embedded in the way the individual 
interprets, and interacts with, the world and thus continue long after the traumatic events 
end because specific behavioural patterns have been firmly established historically 
(even if they no longer relate directly to the current context).  
8. Once established, especially early in development, these alternative behaviours will 
likely impede the emergence of more common or typical behaviours (e.g. social 
contact).  
9. As a result, the more the balance shifts from typical to alternative behavioural 
repertoires, the more difficult it will be to change those behaviours and the more those 
behaviours will look ‘dysfunctional’ in a typical environment.  
10. Given such a history, details of the experiences would ‘make sense’ to the individual 
and would likely make little sense to anyone else, especially someone with a more 
typical history. For example, someone who has never lived with threat has limited 
understanding of the lengths one might go to avoid threat or harm.  
11. The functions served by voice hearing and similar experiences are deeply embedded in 
histories of trauma and these histories ‘make sense’ of those behaviours. While similar 
histories can produce different behaviours and different histories can produce similar 
behaviours, there are clear functional links between the history and the behaviour. As a 
result, behavioural outcomes of history do not reflect abnormal processes per se. If 
anything, they reflect atypical histories and behavioural responses to these. 
A Functional-analytic View of Dissociation 
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 A functional-analytic approach typically avoids cognitive, middle and higher level 
terms, because of the need in the behavioural tradition to employ operationally defined 
concepts that are supported by basic research findings (see Barnes-Holmes, Hussey, 
McEnteggart, Barnes-Holmes, & Foody, 2016). The concept of dissociation did not, of 
course, emerge from a functional-analytic school of thought, and thus accounts of the 
potential functions of the behaviours that define dissociation are almost non-existent in the 
literature. Attempts to do so would likely involve questions along the following lines. Does 
dissociation, at least initially provide, escape from aversive events, such as trauma? Does this 
behaviour also involve one’s sense of self, and if so, what is the nature of this complex 
behaviour (i.e. relating to oneself)? Are the processes of the development of self fractured and 
how does this happen? 
 In the section below, we turn specifically to Relational Frame Theory (RFT) and we 
do so for two key reasons. First, RFT offers an already well-supported functional-analytic 
account of complex behaviour, and it is our view that this is precisely what hearing voices and 
dissociation are – complex patterns of behaviour that come to serve important psychological 
functions for those individuals. In functional-analytic terms, the aim therefore is to describe 
these patterns of behaviour succinctly and explain what purposes they serve. Second, RFT 
also offers a well-supported functional-analytic account of the sense of self and others, which 
suggests a useful insight into possible developments and alterations in these perspectives, as 
they apply to voice hearing, dissociation and trauma. To date, we were aware of no such 
application of RFT concepts to an understanding of voice hearing. 
 Relational Frame Theory (RFT). Relational frame theory provides a contextual 
account of the processes that underpin complex language and cognition (e.g. naming, 
storytelling, deception, humour, perspective-taking and so on). At its core, the theory focuses 
on the behaviour of forming relations among stimuli or events (also called deriving because 
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this type of behaviour does not have to be established directly). For RFT, this behaviour can 
take one of two forms. 
1.  You could relate two red stimuli as similar on the basis of colour (i.e. if both are red), 
and as such this relational response is controlled by the shared physical property 
(redness) of the two stimuli (i.e. your relating behaviour is based on discriminating that 
redness is shared between the two stimuli). This is what pre-linguistic infants do and 
what many types of animals do with exceptional precision.  
2.  A more complex type of behaviour, however, involves relating two events that have no 
shared physical property. For example, we relate coins together based on monetary 
value, rather than physical size, colour, shape, etc. Relational frame theory refers to this 
behaviour as relational framing and proposes that the relations are applied arbitrarily to 
stimuli (e.g. why is a smaller coin sometimes worth more than a larger one? This 
attribution was arbitrary at some point in history and now it is arbitrarily applied to 
those coins). This type of relating behaviour requires an extensive history of a particular 
language to establish these arbitrarily applicable relations. Indeed, there is little or no 
evidence to suggest that pre-linguistic infants or animals can do much of this, although 
there is sound evidence that children can do much more as they become increasingly 
language sophisticated (Luciano et al., 2009).   
 Relational frame theory subdivides the various patterns of relational responding into 
what are called relational frames and those identified thus far are as follows. 1. Co-ordination 
relations specify sameness or similarity and relating is this way is often controlled by words 
such as “is” (e.g. “the world is round” co-ordinates the Earth with roundness in shape). 2. 
Opposition relations specify extreme difference between stimuli (i.e. at the two far ends of a 
continuum) and are often controlled by phrases such as “is the opposite of” (e.g. day is 
opposite to night). 3. Distinction relations also specify difference and are controlled by 
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phrases such as “different from”. For example, “cats are different from dogs” specifies that at 
least in some ways the two animals are not the same (nor are they opposite). 4. Comparative 
relations specify relative similarity or difference, usually along a specific dimension. The 
phrases that control this pattern of responding include “bigger/smaller/lighter than” etc. and 
the specific words used to help to specify the dimension of comparison (i.e. size, weight, etc.). 
5. Hierarchical relations also specify relative comparisons, but critically involve containment. 
These relational responses are often controlled by phrases such as “contains/belongs to” and 
family trees are a classic example. Critically, for RFT, each of these relational frames can 
operate alone and with each other comprising complex relational networks, the basis of all 
complex behaviour. 
6. The perspective-taking or deictic relations appear somewhat different from the other 
frames as they specify an individual’s perspective along interpersonal, spatial and temporal 
dimensions (e.g. I am HERE-NOW and YOU are THERE-THEN). For RFT, the perspective-
taking relations constitute the locus of control from which an individual views the self, others 
and the world, hence one’s perspective always operates from HERE-NOW. That is, for RFT 
the relations that are being derived in this case are denoted as I-HERE-NOW -- a combination 
of interpersonal and spatial deictic relational framing.  
The Relationship between Deictic Relations and Dissociative Processes. Through 
our developmental histories, we typically acquire a strong perspective of the self (I-HERE-
NOW) and a strong distinction between self and others (OTHERS-THERE-THEN). That is, 
individuals always see the world from their own perspective of I-HERE-NOW and appreciate 
the views of others as OTHERS-THERE-THEN. As a result, it is unlikely that an individual 
can see the world through the eyes of another because of this core distinction in terms of the 
interpersonal and spatial relations, and because of the importance of developing a stable sense 
of self and perspective-taking.  
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However, we would argue that traumatic histories weaken this healthy distinction 
between self and others. Consider these different histories as illustrated in the top half of 
Figure 1. Traumatic early relationships may involve significant others who are over-
controlling, intrusive, or unpredictable (e.g. when children are told that they are not allowed 
to cry or that they are not currently experiencing certain emotions). As a result of such 
experiences, a child might derive a co-ordination relation between self and others from the 
perspective of HERE-NOW. That is, from the child’s perspective, others (usually THERE-
THEN) appear to have control over her psychological content (emotions, etc.) HERE-NOW. 
Given this type of intrusive and externally-controlled history, a child could readily derive the 
relations OTHERS-HERE-NOW because many aspects of the child’s experience HERE-
NOW is dictated by others. The result of such a history is that instead of the child operating 
from the relational perspective I-HERE-NOW and this being highly distinct from OTHERS-
THERE-THEN, the child may operate from a looser, externally mediated perspective of I & 
OTHERS-HERE-NOW. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  
 
We would argue that this process (I & OTHERS-HERE-NOW) is the foundation of the 
dissociative experience, because the unique nature of I-HERE-NOW has been intruded upon. 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the sense of I-ness remains HERE-NOW even 
whilst an individual is encountering a dissociative experience (i.e. I-ness is not THERE-
THEN). What is critical, we argue, is that many aspects of I-ness are co-ordinated with 
OTHERS, leaving the individual highly vulnerable and psychologically unsafe. In our view, 
this increased co-ordination of self and others in the HERE-NOW is somewhat specific to the 
dissociative experience and is at least less common in other patterns of psychological 
suffering, such as depression, anxiety, etc. 
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Dissociative experiences also vary by degree of dissociation, where more extreme and 
distressing levels involve derealisation and depersonalisation. We believe that our current 
model can also account for these experiences, using the same basic processes. In brief, we 
propose that in certain extreme contexts, one’s perspective can shift from I & OTHERS-
HERE-NOW to I & OTHERS-THERE-THEN (as if one was operating from the perspective of 
another). That is, in extreme dissociation I is co-ordinated with OTHER, but unlike our 
descriptions above, I is now also operating THERE-THEN and separate from a perspective 
HERE-NOW. Such experiences are likely to be removed from conscious awareness because 
one’s perspective is not operating in the HERE-NOW (see the bottom half of Figure 1 for a 
schematic representation of these experiences). Naturally, this process does not occur as a 
result of all traumatic histories, but is very likely as a result of severe childhood adversities, in 
particular, because of the potential need to remove oneself from traumatic events HERE-
NOW.  
 The Relationship between Dissociative Processes and Hearing Voices. In a 
nutshell, the model we propose suggests that dissociation involves relating to the self and 
others from the perspective of I & OTHERS-HERE-NOW (rather than I-HERE-NOW and 
OTHERS-THERE-THEN), where the essential distinction between the self and others is 
reduced and I-OTHERS are co-ordinated on many levels. One of the ways in which this co-
ordination may manifest itself is in responding to one’s internal events as if they were external 
(e.g. experienced as if through the voices of others). In other words, thoughts, feelings etc. 
would not be discriminated (or experienced) from the perspective of I-HERE-NOW, but 
rather from the perspective I & OTHERS-HERE NOW. As a result of this co-ordination, the 
individual could not accurately decipher whether the experience belongs to the self or others 
(i.e. whether it was internal or external), because I and others are co-ordinated. In the context 
of a traumatic history, this co-ordinated relational response could serve important functions of 
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avoiding or alleviating pain associated with specific thoughts and feelings (in a sense what I 
think and feel are no longer only mine). Paradoxically, however, if this I-OTHERS co-
ordination continues and enables the individual to dissociate from current experience, across 
time this will actually serve to reinforce the co-ordination and destabilise or fragment the self 
further. Put simply, the more I co-ordinate my own experience with others (and dissociate this 
from my own perspective), the more likely I am to externalise my current experience and the 
more threatening others can become.  
Summary and Conclusions  
In proposing the model above of the actualisation of self and others in trauma and 
dissociation, and their role on the development of voice hearing, the following suppositions 
seem feasible (again these overlap with some described elsewhere in the literature).  
1. There is likely a multitude of historical functions served by the behaviour of voice 
hearing (e.g. escape, avoidance, nurture, etc.). 
2. Voice hearing appears to be a common form of a broader class of responding more 
widely known as dissociation. 
3. Voice hearing would not necessarily “feel” dissociative to an individual, especially 
where it has become a part of the lived experience, but from a functional-analytic 
perspective, we suggest that the processes underpinning this behaviour are dissociative. 
4. A history of trauma provides a common context for the emergence of dissociation, 
especially where significant others exert control over a child’s internal experience (such 
as emotions).  
5. For voice hearing to be defined as a form of dissociation, it must involve a process 
which centres around the self and others, where there is an impairment of the natural 
psychological boundaries between these person perspectives. 
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6. Specifically, from an RFT point of view, dissociation represents a significant disruption 
in the typical development of distinction relations between self and others. 
7. Instead of others being distinct from my perspective, others become co-ordinated with 
my perspective. 
8. This atypical co-ordination likely has severe and negative developmental consequences. 
9. The process we proposed to underlie dissociation is the co-ordination of self and others 
in on-going experience (i.e. I & OTHERS-HERE-NOW).   
10. In a dissociative episode, the on-going experience may become spatially and temporally 
distinct from the self (I & OTHERS-THERE-THEN), where the outside world is not 
experienced HERE-NOW. This process may account for amnesia and fugue states. 
11. Dissociation behaviours appear to serve several historical functions, one of which may 
be to avoid/escape the perspective from which your reality is being experienced, 
because physical escape is not possible.  
12. One clinical implication suggested by this model is that therapeutic ‘intervention’ 
should understand the behaviours associated with a sense of self that is fragile and 
threatened by others. Relations with self and others should be a key focus of therapy, as 
well as interventions designed to enhance a coherent distinct sense of self. Consider, for 
example the different approaches adopted by traditional psychotherapy versus the 
Maastricht Approach. The former typically seeks to reduce or undermine voice hearing 
experiences, while the latter explicitly validates and supports voice hearing. Our current 
model suggests that the latter is likely more effective because phenomenological feaures 
of voices offer direction into what the functions of this behaviour are. Furthermore, 
clinical attempts to control the voice hearer’s internal experiences (i.e. voice hearing) 
resemble the problematic behaviour of others in the individual’s history who 
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excessively controlled the individual’s internal experiences. Doing so will only serve to 
reinforce the existing relational response patterns (e.g. I & OTHERS-HERE-NOW)    
13. One empirical implication is to use a functional-analytic approach to test the trauma-
dissociation developmental trajectory, and the extent to which trauma, self and others 
play in the development and maintenance of dissociative experiences. In our own 
research, we have begun to examine the types of deictic relational responses 
demonstrated by individuals without voice hearing compared with samples who do hear 
voices but who are or are not clinically distressed. We have also examined the reactions 
of these different samples to voice hearing experiences. Indeed in one study by 
McEnteggart et al. (under submission), we reported that on an implicit measure, both 
clinical and non-clinical voice hearers evaluated their voices negatively, accepted 
positive voices and avoided negative voices. We also found that acceptance of positive 
voices predicted high psychological inflexibility.  
The model we propose bears considerable overlap, in our opinion, with a number of 
models outlined in the previous section, particularly those which pointed to the self and 
relationships with others as central to the dissociative process, in which there are alterations or 
fragmentations in order to escape from a painful context (Longden et al., 2012; McIntee & 
Compton, 1997; Mollon, 1996; Perona-Garcelan et al., 2015; Ross, 2009; Young, 1999). 
Furthermore, our model also complements those suggested by both Romme and Escher 
(2000) and by Ross (e.g. 2000). In the former, Romme and Escher articulate an essentially 
diathesis-stress model of voice hearing that also places strong emphasis on the individual’s 
history, especially a traumatic one as influential on the emergence of strong negative 
appraisals of self (e.g. anger, shame, etc.) and the need to avoid these. Based on this model, 
they then propose a type of psychological formulation called The Construct (similar to the 
Maastricht Interview) which directs interventions surrounding voice hearing in ways that 
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overlap with our suggestions above (e.g. voice person and content relate to childhood 
significant others and serve functions associated with these others). In the latter, Ross 
proposed the Trauma Model for dissociative disorders, in which the role of traumatic histories 
in dissociation are emphasised. They also proposed Trauma Model Therapy which aims to 
assist in the development of an integrated sense of self.  
In formulating the current paper, we were more than surprised to discover that 
functional-analytic psychology had contributed so little to our understanding of voice hearing 
and dissociation more broadly. As functional-analytic psychologists conducting empirical 
research and clinical work with voice hearing individuals, we are constantly struck by the 
extent to which the individual’s sense of self is, and has been, compromised by perceptions of 
the world around then (real or otherwise). In parallel, much existing research supports RFT’s 
functional-analytic account of the self as relational perspective-taking. The current paper is an 
attempt to bring together these two strands to help explain how traumatic histories generate 
experiences in which the development of one’s stable and coherent sense of self is interrupted 
or altered. It is important to emphasise that, for us, these outcomes do not reflect abnormal 
processes but historical and contextual alterations of normal processes that leave the 
individual no option but to develop alternative experiences that serve important behavioural 
and psychological functions. At the core of our account are two key relationships: that 
between oneself and one’s psychological content, and that between the self and others. Our 
current hypotheses suggest that difficulties in the latter create difficulties in the former, in a 
manner that reflects significant alterations in one’s sense of self. For us, this is the kernel and 
function of the dissociative experience.  
At this stage, it is important to re-empahasise that this is only one interpretation which 
may help to identify the key processes at play in the dissociative experience. Of course, this 
approach may not enhance existing models, but it may support their hypotheses, which in turn 
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helps the functional-analytic community to arrive at the same conclusions as other well-
established models. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.Schematic representation of the development of the self/perspective in typical 
versus traumatic developmental trajectories.   
 
 
